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Abstract
Sybil attacks, in which fake or duplicate iden-
tities (sybils) infiltrate an online community,
pose a serious threat to such communities, as
they might tilt community-wide decisions in
their favor. While the extensive research on
sybil identification may help keep the frac-
tion of sybils in such communities low, it can-
not however ensure their complete eradication.
Thus, our goal is to enhance social choice
theory with effective group decision mecha-
nisms for communities with bounded sybil pen-
etration. Inspired by Reality-Aware Social
Choice [Shapiro and Talmon, 2018], we use
the status quo as the anchor of sybil resilience,
characterized by sybil safety – the inability of
sybils to change the status quo against the will
of the genuine agents, and sybil liveness – the
ability of the genuine agents to change the sta-
tus quo against the will of the sybils. We con-
sider the social choice settings of deciding on a
single proposal, on multiple proposals, and on
updating a parameter. For each, we present so-
cial choice rules that are sybil-safe and, under
certain conditions, satisfy sybil-liveness.
1 Introduction
Our initial premise is two-fold: First, even though there
is a vast literature concerned with identifying fake or du-
plicate identities, aka sybils, one cannot assume sybils to
be perfectly identified and completely eradicated. Sec-
ond, a single vote may tilt a majoritarian group decision
and as such, sybils infiltrating a group of agents that em-
ploy egalitarian democratic group decision making liter-
ally pose an existential threat to the group. Thus, here
we address the pressing need to develop group decision
making processes that can be safely used in online com-
munities that are not sybil-free. Indeed, the vast litera-
ture on social choice proposes many aggregation methods
that, unfortunately, cannot be directly used in many on-
line settings, in which a fraction of the electorate might
consist of sybils.
The key concept in our approach to sybil resilience is
the use of the present state of affairs, namely the status
quo, or Reality, as the anchor of sybil resilience. We
characterize sybil resilience by sybil safety – the inability
of sybils to change the status quo against the will of the
genuine agents, and sybil liveness – the ability of the
genuine agents to change the status quo against the will
of the sybils (formal definitions in Section 2).
Our goal is to ensure sybil safety without sacrificing
liveness, and to achieve it we follow Reality-Aware So-
cial Choice [Shapiro and Talmon, 2018], which recognizes
reality (i.e., the status quo) as a distinguished and ever-
present alternative.
There are various settings where sybil-resilient deci-
sion making processes are needed, corresponding to dif-
ferent settings of social choice. As the simplest setting,
we first concentrate on the case of a single proposal (i.e.,
an election among two alternatives, one of which is the
status quo). For this setting, we show that requiring a
sybil-resilient supermajority, defined as a simple major-
ity plus half the sybil penetration rate, in order to change
the status quo is safe. Interestingly, a sybil-resilient su-
permajority is similar to Byzantine failures in its tip-
ping point: Below one-third sybil penetration, it assures
both safety and liveness, while above one-third, it as-
sures safety but not liveness, as sybils, while unable to
force a change to the status quo, may block any change
to it.
We then consider ordinal elections for deciding among
multiple alternatives, one of which is the status quo (re-
ality). We describe an efficient Amendment Agenda
that is safe and provides liveness when sybil penetra-
tion is under one third. Finally, we consider sybil-
resilience when deciding upon the value of a parameter,
e.g., the interest rate or inflation rate of a sovereign cur-
rency, the conductance and solidarity of an expanding
e-community [Poupko et al., 2019], the votes threshold
for parties in a parliamentary system, or the gas price of
a cryptocurrency. Assuming single-peakedness for this
setting, we describe a rule that, briefly put, disregards
sufficiently-many extreme votes, and show it to be sybil-
safe.
Related Work. There is a vast literature on defend-
ing against sybil attacks, see, e.g., recent surveys [Alvisi
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et al., 2013; Viswanath et al., 2010]. That literature is
usually concerned with graphs on which the genuine and
sybil entities reside, and the focus is usually not on group
decision making. E.g., Douceur [2002] describes a very
general model for studying sybil resilience and presents
some initial negative results in this model. Many pa-
pers consider leveraging graph properties such as vari-
ous centrality measures to identify suspicious nodes (see,
e.g., [Cao et al., 2012]). As further examples, Molavi et
al. [2013] aim to shield online ranking sites from the neg-
ative effects of sybils and Chiang et al. [2013] consider
sybil-resilience in the context of radio networks.
We are particularly interested in sybil-resilient group
decision making. This scenario is considered by Tran
et al. [2009], but with a different goal and solution:
While we aim to protect democratic decisions from sybil
attacks, they are considering ranking online content.
Other relevant papers are the paper of Conitzer and
Yokoo [2010], concentrating on axiomatic characteriza-
tions of sybil-resilient rules in a certain formal model.
In essence, Conitzer et al. show that in a model with-
out a distinguished status quo alternative, the only vot-
ing rules which are sybil-safe, in the sense that there
is no incentive for an attacker to produce sybils, is of
the form “if all vote unanimously for c, pick c, oth-
erwise pick a winner at random”. Indeed, this neg-
ative result can also be seen as a motivation for our
model of sybil-safety, which does incorporate the sta-
tus quo as a distinguished alternative, as this allows
for a conservative default to the status quo, render-
ing the negative result of Conitzer et al. inapplica-
ble. Related papers exist [Wagman and Conitzer, 2008;
2014; Waggoner et al., 2012; Conitzer et al., 2010;
Conitzer, 2008].
We also mention the vast literature on control and
bribery in elections [Faliszewski and Rothe, 2016], study-
ing malicious entities aiming at changing elections out-
comes (we also mention recent work connecting bribery
to robustness measures of voting rules [Bredereck et al.,
2017; Faliszewski et al., 2017]). The model of election
control assumes a given voting rule and a given elec-
torate, and the question is whether an external agent,
called the chair of the election, may change the elec-
tion structure, e.g. by adding or removing candidates
or votes, to have its preferred candidate win (or lose).
The model of a sybil attack is that of an external agent
that cannot change the vote structure, but has control
of the actual votes of a fraction of the electorate (the
sybils and their creators/perpetrators). Hence, formally,
a sybil attack by a fraction σ ∈ [0, 1] of the voters is sim-
ilar to election control where the chair may add up to a
fraction σ of the voters. However, rather than studying
how this specific form of control may affect existing vot-
ing rules, we design new voting rules that are resilient to
sybil attacks, a notion defined below.
2 Abstract Model
In this paper we use disjoint union X = Y unionmulti Z as a
shorthand for X = Y ∪ Z, Y ∩ Z = ∅. Our model is as
follows. We assume a set of agents V = H unionmulti S which is
a union of two disjoint sets, the set of genuine agents H
and the set of sybils S. We wish to design sybil-resilient
voting rules for the agents V . We assume that all agents
participate in every vote1, so we overload the notation
and identify the agent v ∈ V with its vote. We follow
Reality-Aware Social Choice in considering decisions on
a set of alternatives A that always includes the status
quo r ∈ A (reality) as a distinguished, ever-present al-
ternative. Given such a set A and n votes over it, a voting
rule returns a set of alternatives as the co-winners of the
election. The specific set of allowed alternatives and the
mathematical objects modeling a vote are different for
each social choice setting we consider; we elaborate on
these in the corresponding sections, but first we make an
abstract exposition.
2.1 Sybil Safety and Sybil Liveness
We wish to have voting rules that are sybil safe, in the
sense that they prevent sybils from changing the status
quo against the will of the genuine agents. But how
is the will of the genuine agents defined? Presumably,
via en established voting rule, e.g., the majority rule
when voting on a single proposal against the status quo,
or some social choice function when voting on multiple
alternatives. The following definition aims to capture
this intent by defining a voting rule to be safe (with
respect to a base voting rule) if it elects an alternative
to the status quo when applied to votes of all agents only
if the base rule may elect this alternative when applied
to a subset of the votes – the votes of the genuine agents.
Definition 1 (Sybil Safety). Consider a set of alterna-
tives A with reality r ∈ A, a set of agents V = H unionmulti S,
and let R and R′ be two voting rules. Then, the vot-
ing rule R is sybil safe with respect to R′, or safe for
short, if the following holds: If R(V )∩A\{r} 6= ∅ , then
R(V ) ⊆ R′(H). That is, if R chooses some alternative
a 6= r, then a is chosen also by R′ over the honest voters.
Remark 1. Below we consider three social choice set-
tings: voting on one proposal, voting on multiple alter-
natives, and voting on the value of a parameter. For
each setting we chose a base voting rule that is suit-
able for the domain, employing three criteria: (i) Broad
recognition (ii) Simplicity; (iii) Ease of attaining safety.
Specifically, we rely on May’s theorem [May, 1952], the
Condorcet criterion [Gehrlein, 1985], and Black’s theo-
rem [Black, 1948],respectively, in choosing the base rules
for the three settings.
We wish to stress the importance of simplicity: The
trust of voters in the voting process critically depends
on their understanding of it. Hence a voting rule must
1A forthcoming paper explores how proxy voting/vote del-
egation can be employed to relax this assumption and still
retain sybil resilience.
be easy to communicate, even at the expense of other
desirable properties that can be achieved only through
complications. 
As sybil safety can be achieved trivially by sticking
with the status quo, it must be combined with a liveness
requirement – that the genuine agents are able to change
the status quo despite the sybils.
Definition 2 (Sybil Liveness). Consider a set of agents
V = H unionmulti S, a set of alternatives A, reality r ∈ A, and a
voting rule R. We say that R satisfies sybil liveness for
V and A, or liveness for short, if, for any set of votes of
the sybils S and for any alternative a ∈ A \ {r}, there is
a set of votes of the genuine agents for which R, applied
to all agents, elects a.
Note that while safety is being defined with respect to
a base rule, liveness isn’t, as liveness merely makes sure
that some progress can be made according to the current
rule; safety than ensures any such progress is safe with
respect to the base rule.
We use the term sybil resilience to refer jointly to sybil
safety and sybil liveness. For each of the settings we
consider here, our main goal is: Ensure sybil resilience
without being unnecessarily conservative in defending the
status quo. The following definition captures a specific
aspect of sybil resilience.
Definition 3 (Sybil-Penetration Resilience). A voting
rule R is resilient to the penetration of up to σ sybils
with respect to a base voting rule R′, if it ensures sybil
safety with respect to R′ and sybil liveness for every set
of agents V = HunionmultiS, provided the sybil penetration rate
is below σ, namely |S||V | < σ.
Remark 2. How to estimate the sybil penetration σ is
an important question. While in some cases there might
be other techniques available, usually it is natural to
assume that by sampling a voter one can estimate the
probability that the voter is genuine or fake (e.g., looking
at her Facebook profile). Thus, the main general tech-
nique we suggest is to sample voters uniformly at random
and, given the sampling results, estimate σ. Note that
using such sampling it is then possible to compute, for a
given value p, a value z, such that the probability that
σ is greater than z is at most p. Alternatively, one can
compute the mean m of the sample and take an  margin
of safety, i.e., use m+  as the estimate for σ.
3 Sybil-Resilience for One Proposal
We begin our investigation with yes/no decisions on a
single proposal p, where a yes vote favors p and a no
vote favors the status quo (e.g., Brexit vs. Remain). So,
formally, the set of alternatives is A = {p, r}, and each
vote v ∈ V is either v = p or v = r. For this setting, it
is natural to use supermajority as the basis for a sybil-
safe decision rule, and to use simple majority as the base
decision rule against which sybil-safely is measured.
Definition 4 (δ-Supermajority). In a decision on a pro-
posal p against the status quo r, the proposal p is said
to win by a δ-supermajority, δ ∈ [0, 1/2], if more than
1/2 + δ of the agents prefer p over r (i.e., vote for p).
The proposal wins by a simple majority if it wins by a
0-supermajority.
Definition 5 (Reality-Aware δ-Supermajority Rule).
When deciding on a single proposal p against the sta-
tus quo r, the reality-aware δ-supermajority rule elects p
if it is preferred over r by a δ-supermajority, else it elects
the status quo r. The reality-aware 0-supermajority rule
is referred to as the majority rule.
Remark 3. Notice that δ-supermajority rule with δ >
0 follows Reality-Aware Social Choice in favoring the
status quo. 
Requiring δ = 1/2−,  < 1|V | , would render the reality-
aware δ-supermajority rule sybil safe, as it would elect
the proposal only if all agents are in favor of it; it would,
however, be unnecessarily conservative. Next we charac-
terize the minimal δ needed for safety.
Lemma 1 (Safety of Supermajority). Let V = H unionmultiS be
the set of agents, σ = |S||V | , and let p and r be a proposal
and the status quo. Then, if p is preferred over r by a
σ/2-supermajority of all agents, then p is preferred over r
by a majority of the genuine agents.
Proof. Consider the equation:
1/2 + δ =
σ + 1/2 · (1− σ)
σ + (1− σ) ,
with the left side of the equation being the δ-
supermajority required for the majority of the genuine
agents to vote for the proposal, assuming all sybils also
vote for it, and with the right side being the sybils (σ)
and the majority (1/2) of the genuine agents (1− σ), di-
vided by the total agents, namely the sybils (σ) and the
genuine agents (1− σ). Solving for δ gives δ = σ/2.
Remark 4. The value σ/2 above is tight, as any value
strictly smaller than σ/2 would not be safe. To see this,
assume that all sybils, as well as slightly less than half
of the genuine agents, vote in favor of the proposal p.
Theorem 1 (Safety of Reality-Aware Supermajority
Rule). Let V = H unionmulti S be the set of agents and σ = |S||V | .
Then, the reality-aware σ/2-supermajority rule is safe
with respect to the majority rule.
Proof. Follows Lemma 1 and Definitions 1 and 5.
Next, we offer a measure for the conservatism of a su-
permajority rule, by investigating the situations in which
the genuine agents can indeed change the status quo.
Definition 6 (Supermajority Conservatism). Let V =
H unionmulti S be the set of agents and let R be a reality-aware
supermajority voting rule. The conservatism ρ of R is
defined as the supermajority among the genuine agents
needed in order to change the status quo, according toR,
assuming all sybils vote in favor of the status quo.
Figure 1: Conservatism rate ρ as a function of σ and δ.
Observation 1. The conservatism of the reality-aware
δ-supermajority rule, given a sybil penetration rate σ, is
ρ =
1/2 + δ
1− σ −
1/2.
Proof. Let V = H unionmultiS be the set of agents, σ = |S||V | , and
consider the reality-aware δ-supermajority rule where
we have σn sybils, all voting in favor of the status
quo, and (1 − σ)n genuine agents. Then, for a ρ-
supermajority among the genuine agents, which is ex-
actly (1−σ)n(1/2+ρ) genuine agents voting for the pro-
posal to change the status quo, they shall constitute at
least a ( 12 +
σ
2 )-fraction of the full electorate, which con-
tains n agents. Thus, solving the equation
(1− σ)n
(
1
2
+ ρ
)
=
(
1
2
+ δ
)
n
for ρ gives the result.
Figure 1 depicts the conservatism rate ρ as given by
the formula in Observation 1.
Remark 5. Of particular interest is the special case
δ = σ/2, which, following Observation 1, implies a con-
servatism of ρ = σ1−σ . Notice that: (i) If there are no
sybils, then ρ = 0, which corresponds to a simple ma-
jority. (ii) On the other extreme, if a 1/3-fraction of the
agents are sybils, then ρ = 1/2, meaning that the pro-
posal cannot be chosen even if all genuine agents are
unanimously for it, violating liveness. The same is true
of course if more than 1/3-fraction of the agents are sybils.
(iii) With single-digit sybil-penetration, i.e. σ < 10%,
the above gives ρ < 1/9, hence the supermajority needed
among genuine agents would be under 61.2%, which is
quite reasonable.
Corollary 1 (Supermajority Liveness). Let V = H unionmulti S
be the set of agents and let σ = |S||V | . If all genuine agents
vote, then the reality-aware σ/2-supermajority rule satis-
fies sybil liveness if and only if σ < 1/3.
Proof. Following Observation 1, we have that ρ = σ1−σ .
Solving σ1−σ < 1/2 for σ, corresponding to almost 1/2-
supermajority (unanimity among the genuine agents),
gives σ < 1/3.
Corollary 2 (Supermajority Resilience). The σ/2-
supermajority rule is resilient to a penetration of up to
σ = 1/3 sybils.
Hence, we refer to the reality-aware σ/2-supermajority,
with σ < 1/3, as sybil-resilient supermajority.
Remark 6. As with Byzantine failures, a sybil penetra-
tion of σ = 1/3 is an inflection point wrt. sybil-resilience
of σ/2-supermajority: Up to 1/3 sybils, a simple majority
among the genuine agents can defend the status quo, i.e.,
veto a change to it, and a sufficiently large supermajority
of the genuine agents may change the status quo. So the
sybils can neither enforce a change nor veto one, if the
genuine agents are sufficiently determined and united.
From 1/3 sybils and above, however, the sybils have a
veto right: If the sybils unanimously object to a change,
then no majority of the genuine agents can effect it.
4 Sybil-Resilient Ordinal Elections
We assume the ordinal model of elections, thus each vote
is a ranking over the set of alternatives A that includes
the status quo r ∈ A. Formally, denoting the set of all
rankings over a set of alternatives A by L(A), we de-
fine a voting rule to be a function R : L(A)n → 2A
that takes n ordinal votes over A and returns a set of
tied elected alternatives. If a singleton is elected from
A, then it is referred to as the winner of R for the elec-
tion. Otherwise, each of the alternatives returned from
R is referred to as a co-winner of the election. Notice
that, for technical reasons, we do not consider tie break-
ing. Our approach to sybil-resilience for this setting is
to adapt the Condorcet principle. We need the following
definition first.
Definition 7 (Reality-Viable Alternatives). Let V be
a set of agents, A a set of alternatives with r ∈ A the
reality, and let δ ∈ [0, 1/2]. An alternative a ∈ A is
δ-reality-viable (δ-viable for short) if a beats r by a δ-
supermajority; i.e., if at least a 1/2 + δ-fraction of the
voters (weakly) prefer a over r. We denote the set of
δ-reality-viable alternatives by Aδr. If δ = 0, δ can be
omitted and the set of reality-viable alternatives Ar is
defined via a simple majority.
The following definition presents two variants2 of a
Reality-aware Condorcet voting rule, which will serve
as the base rules against which we will measure sybil
resilience.
Definition 8 (Reality-Aware Condorcet Rule). Let A
be a set of alternatives with r ∈ A. If Ar has a Condorcet
winner, then elect it. Else, either:
1. (Conservative rule) elect r.
2. (Permissive rule) elect all of Ar as co-winners.
We will adapt these Reality-aware Condorcet voting
rules to be sybil-resilient by replacing simple majority
by a δ-supermajority. But first we need to adapt the
notion of a Condorcet winner to use δ-supermajorities.
2Other variants, such as using any tournament solution,
are also possible but not explored here.
Definition 9 (δ-Supermajority Condorcet winner). Let
A be a set of alternatives and let δ ∈ [0, 1/2]. An alterna-
tive a ∈ A is a δ-supermajority Condorcet winner if a is
preferred over any a′ ∈ A, a 6= a′, by a δ-supermajority.
Our approach extends the Condorcet principle as it
is adapted to Reality-Aware Social Choice by employ-
ing supermajorities. Specifically, next we discuss several
reality-aware Condorcet criteria adapted to our setting
via δ-supermajorities; voting rules that adhere to these
criteria follow in a straightforward way.
Definition 10 (Reality-Aware δ-Supermajority Con-
dorcet criterion). Let A be a set of alternatives with
r ∈ A, and let δ ∈ [0, 1/2]. If Aδr has a δ-supermajority
Condorcet winner then elect it. Else, either:
1. (Conservative criterion) elect r.
2. (Permissive criterion) elect all of Aδr as co-winners.
Notice that all variants of the Reality-Aware 0-
supermajority Condorcet criteria (i.e., where δ = 0) are
identical to the variants of the Reality-Aware Condorcet
criteria (Definition 8).
The next theorem characterizes the minimal δ for
which voting rules satisfying the above criteria are safe
with respect to the base Condorcet rules defined ear-
lier. Notice that Definition 10 is concerned with sybil-
resilience and incorporate δ-supermajorities. In con-
trast, Definition 8 employs simple majorities.
Theorem 2. Let V = H unionmultiS be the set of agents and let
σ = |S||V | . Then, a voting rule satisfying Reality-Aware
σ/2-supermajority Condorcet criterion (Definition 10) is
safe with respect to the Conservative Reality-Aware Con-
dorcet rule (Definition 8).
Proof. Let A be the set of alternatives with the real-
ity being r ∈ A, let R be a rule satisfying the Reality-
Aware σ/2-Supermajority Condorcet Criterion, and let c
be its winner in a given election. If c = r, then we are
done as electing the status quo is always safe. Else, if
c 6= r, then c wins over each alternative in Aσ/2r by a
σ/2-Supermajority. Hence, by Lemma 1, c wins over all
these alternatives by a simple majority among the gen-
uine agents; thus, if there is a Condorcet winner among
the genuine agents then it must be c. So, the Reality-
Aware Condorcet Rule would elect either c or r.
The following Observation 2 and Corollary 3 follow a
reasoning similar to Observation 1 and Corollary 2.
Observation 2. The conservatism of a Reality-Aware
δ-Supermajority Condorcet consistent rule, given a pen-
etration rate σ of sybils, is ρ =
1/2+δ
1−σ − 1/2.
Corollary 3. A Reality-Aware σ/2-Supermajority Con-
dorcet rule is resilient to a penetration of up to σ = 1/3
sybils.
Remark 7. While here we consider only linear orders, it
is possible to extend the analysis to accommodate partial
orders, including weak rankings and 1-Approval ballots
(where each voter declares her most preferred alterna-
tive).
An Efficient Sybil-Resilient Amendment Agenda.
For concreteness and for practical applications, we com-
plement the discussion with an efficient algorithmic real-
ization of the supermajority Condorcet criteria defined
above. Our realization is based on Llull’s Amendment
Agenda (1299, cf. [McLean, 1990]): Arrange all alterna-
tives in some order, vote the first against the second, the
winner of the two against the third, and so on, then elect
the final winner. The Amendment Agenda is Condorcet
consistent. We make four enhancements to this Agenda:
(i) We consider only δ-reality-viable alternatives; (ii) we
start with the reality r; (iii) we employ sybil-resilient
supermajorities; and (iv) at the end we check for a Con-
dorcet top-cycle, and resort to reality if one is detected.
Algorithm 1 (Conservative δ-Supermajority Amend-
ment Agenda). Let A be the set of alternatives with
r ∈ A and let δ ∈ [0, 1/2]. If Aδr = ∅, elect r. Else, per-
form an Amendment Agenda vote on Aδr starting with r
and employing δ-supermajorities, and let w ∈ Aδr be the
winner. Then, vote w against all members of Aδr not
previously voted against w, if any. If w wins all these
votes by a δ-supermajority then elect w. Else elect r.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 satisfies the Conservative
Reality-Aware δ-Supermajority Condorcet criterion.
Proof. We do a case analysis. First, if Aδr = ∅, then the
Agenda elects r; this is what the axiom dictates. Other-
wise, i.e., if Aδr 6= ∅ then there are two cases to consider:
First, if there is a δ-supermajority Condorcet winner c,
then c will be the final winner as it will not be eliminated
during the agenda and will also beat all alternatives in
the check at the end of the Agenda, thus c will be elected
as dictated by the criterion. Otherwise, the final winner
w of the Agenda is not a δ-supermajority Condorcet win-
ner, and thus there will be at least one alternative w′ for
which w will not win by a δ-supermajority, thus r will
be elected, again as dictated by the criterion.
Remark 8. An Amendment Agenda corresponding to
the permissive δ-supermajority Condorcet rule can be
obtained by revising the final “Else” clause to be “Else
arbitrarily elect a member of Aδr.” The proof is similar.
Many other sybil-resilient tournament solutions can be
obtained by revising the “Else” clause appropriately.
Remark 9. Observe that our results for a single pro-
posal (Section 3) carry over to the sybil-resilient Con-
dorcet criteria: For one proposal, all variants of the
Reality-Aware δ-Supermajority Condorcet rule as well
as our sybil-resilient amendment agenda boil down to
the one-proposal δ-supermajority rule.
5 Sybil-Resilient Parameter Update
We consider sybil-resilience when deciding upon the
value of a parameter, e.g., the target inflation rate, the
interest rate of a sovereign currency, the gas price of a
cryptocurrency, the conductance and solidarity of an ex-
panding e-community [Poupko et al., 2019], or the votes
threshold for a party in a parliamentary system. In all
these examples, we may assume that each voter has a
preferred value for the parameter (an ideal point), and
the closer the elected value to the ideal point, the happier
the voter.
We model such settings by considering a one-
dimensional single-peaked domain; specifically, we as-
sume that the parameter can take real-valued numbers,
that each voter has a single ideal point v ∈ R which she
declares as her vote, and single-peakedness then means
that a voter with ideal point v prefers some y to z if
v ≤ y < z or if z < y ≤ v. We stress that, contrary to
the setting of Section 4, here voters declare only their
ideal points and not their rankings. The assumption of
single-peakedness then allows us to devise sybil-resilient
voting rules for this setting despite the fact the the do-
main of alternatives is infinite.
Black’s Median Voter Theorem [Black, 1948] states
that within this model, the ideal point of the median
voter is the unique unbeaten point and the Condorcet
winner. Consider electing the value of the parameter de
novo. How can it be made sybil-safe if even a single sybil
may affect the identity of the median voter and, further-
more, it cannot be determined whether such a sybil has
tilted the median to be higher or lower? Lacking an an-
swer and being inspired by Reality-Aware Social Choice
we, therefore, forgo de novo parameter election and con-
sider the problem of parameter update: Given the cur-
rent value of a parameter, how can its value be updated
in a sybil-resilient way? Formally, we aim at designing a
parameter update rule R, which is a function that takes
the current parameter value r and a set of n votes and
returns a new value for the parameter (all values in R).
As before, we are interested in sybil-safety, which ab-
stractly means that the current value of the parameter
shall change only if the genuine voters wish so. Follow-
ing Black’s Median Voter Theorem, we wish to use the
median rule as the base rule. But, to overcome the lim-
itation of the median being well-defined only for an odd
number of voters, we employ reality as follows.
Definition 11 (Reality-Aware Median). Let r be the
current value of the parameter and V be the set of votes.
The reality-aware median v∗ of V is the median of V if
|V | is odd and the median of V ∪ {r} otherwise.
Remark 10. The effect of the definition for an even
number of 2k ordered votes is as follows: If vk ≤ vk+1 ≤
r, then the reality-aware median is v∗ := vk+1; if r ≤
vk ≤ vk+1, then v∗ := vk; and if vk ≤ r ≤ vk+1, then
v∗ := r. This means that the present value r breaks ties
in its favour, and in particular if half the voters wish
to increase the parameter and half to decrease it, the
present value of the parameter remains, as it should. 
We use the reality-aware median to define the base
rule against which we will measure sybil safety.
Definition 12 (Reality-Aware Median Base Rule). Let
r be the current value of the parameter, V be the set
of votes, and v∗ the reality-aware median of the voters.
If r ≤ v∗, then the Reality-Aware Median Base Rule
returns the set {v ∈ V : r ≤ v ≤ v∗}, and if v∗ ≤ r, then
it returns the set {v ∈ V : v∗ ≤ v ≤ r}.
Namely, a parameter update rule is safe wrt. the
reality-aware median base rule if it does not change the
value of the parameter further than the reality-aware me-
dian v∗ of the genuine agents or in an opposite direction
to it. Indeed, the degenerate rule that never changes
the parameter value is safe; liveness then considers the
ability of the genuine agents to change the value of the
parameter in their preferred direction despite the sybils.
Notice how, informally speaking, the single-peakedness
assumption allows speaking of “directions” and not be
confined to Condorcet winners as in Section 4.
A Simple Update Rule. We first present a simple
update rule, which only considers the “directions”.
Definition 13 (Simple Update Rule). Let r be the cur-
rent value of the parameter, V be the set of votes and
σ ∈ [0, 1]. If there is a σ2 -supermajority of ideal points
larger (smaller) than r, then select the smallest ideal
point larger than r (respectively, the largest ideal point
smaller than r); otherwise, select r.
Remark 11. The Simple Update Rule can be seen as
a σ/2-supermajority rule for the case of two proposals
against the status quo, namely p− and p+ against r,
where it is assumed that a voter voting for p− prefers r
over p+ and a voter voting for p+ prefers r over p−.
Observation 3. The Simple Update Rule is sybil-safe
and satisfies liveness whenever σ < 1/3.
A Least-Conservative Update Rule. The simple
update rule satisfies liveness. However, it is quite con-
servative in that it moves in “baby steps”. It is natural
to seek a parameter update rule that not only updates
the parameter in the right direction, but also pushes its
value as far as sybil-safety permits.
Definition 14. Let R and R′ be two parameter update
rules. Then, R is less conservative than R′ if for ev-
ery set of votes V and current parameter value r, the
updated values obtained by these rules satisfy either
r ≤ R′(V, r) ≤ R(V, r) or R(V, r) ≤ R′(V, r) ≤ r.
Our approach to achieve lesser conservatism is as fol-
lows: If the median of the ideal points of all agents is
above the current value, we make the worst-case assump-
tion that all sybils wish to extremely increase the pa-
rameter value; we therefore remove the top σ values and
recompute the new median. If the recomputed median
is still above the current parameter value, then it is safe
to elect it; otherwise, we revert to the status quo. Sup-
pressing these extreme votes can be justified to voters
by saying that, in the worst case, all these votes could
be by sybils and hence, to be on the safe side, we must
ignore them.
Definition 15 (Reality-Aware Median with Outer-σ
Suppression). Let r be the current parameter value, V
be a set of voters and σ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the set V −σ
is obtained by removing from V its top σ-fraction, the
set V−σ is obtained by removing from V its bottom σ-
fraction, v−σ is the reality-aware median of V −σ, and
v−σ is the reality-aware median of V−σ.
Definition 16 (Suppress Outer-σ Parameter Update
Rule). Let r be the current parameter value and V be
the set of votes with reality-aware median v∗. Then, the
Suppress Outer-σ parameter update rule is defined as fol-
lows: If r < v−σ ≤ v∗, then update the parameter to be
v−σ; if v∗ ≤ v−σ < r, then update the parameter to be
v−σ; otherwise keep the current parameter value r.
Theorem 4 (Sybil Resilience of the Suppress Outer-σ
Rule). The Suppress Outer-σ Parameter Update Rule is
resilient up to σ < 1/3 sybil penetration.
Proof. Assume a current value r and a set of agents V =
HunionmultiS. There are three possible outcomes to the Suppress
Outer-σ rule: v−σ, v−σ, and r.
For sybil-safety, consider the first outcome v−σ. As in
this case r < v−σ, what is left to show is that v−σ ≤ v∗.
We consider two sub-cases: (i) There are no sybils left
in V −σ greater than v∗. In this case the difference be-
tween V −σ and H are top genuine votes that are in H
but eliminated from V −σ, if any, and sybils votes smaller
than v∗ in V −σ \H, if any. Hence v−σ ≤ v∗ as required.
(ii) There are sybils in V −σ greater than v∗. In this case,
there must be at least as many top genuine identities
eliminated from V −σ, since σ is a bound on the num-
ber of sybils. Now let us swap the type (genuine/sybil),
but not the vote, of such sybil and genuine votes, so no
sybil votes greater than v∗ are left in V −σ. Doing so
would not affect v−σ, as it is “type-blind”, and would
not affect v∗ since all pairs of type-swapped votes are
greater than v∗. And we are now in sub-case (i) which
has been proved. The safety of the second outcome v−σ
is proved symmetrically, while the third outcome, r, is
safe by definition. For sybil-liveness, assume that σ < 13
and that all genuine agents vote for a certain value q
above r. Since |H| > 23 |V | and V −σ eliminates at most
σ · |V | < 13 |V | of the genuine voters, the genuine votes
will be a majority in V −σ, and hence its median v−σ will
be larger than r, specifically q, resulting in the update
to v−σ. The symmetric argument applies if all genuine
votes are some q below r.
Next we argue that indeed the rule defined above is
the least-conservative update rule.
Remark 12. In particular, if V = v1 ≤ v2 ≤ . . . ≤ vn,
the reality aware median may always assume that n is
odd (if even, it just adds reality to V ). Hence, v∗ :=
vdn/2e, v−σ := vdn/2+σn/2e, and v−σ := vdn/2−σn/2e.
Under this notation, it follows that any voting rule that
elect x, v−σ < x, when r < v∗ is not safe, because when-
ever the honest voters are v1 ≤ v2 ≤ ... ≤ vn(1−σ), then
v∗ = vdn/2−σn/2e = v−σ, and thus r ≤ v∗ < x.
6 Discussion
While a single fake agent may tilt a decision in a group of
agents that employs a group decision making mechanism,
we show that Really-Aware Social Choice can remain
sybil-safe in the face of arbitrarily high sybil penetration,
and, under certain conditions, can retain sybil-liveness.
Specifically, the problem of decision making in the pres-
ence of sybils is important in the real world. Thus, our
first contribution is the development of our model which
includes the status quo together with our definitions of
safety, liveness, and conservatism. As such, our model
allows for developing sybil-resilient rules and opens fur-
ther possibilities for future study (e.g., studying ordinal
elections with Borda as the base rule). Furthermore, we
describe several rules and prove their sybil-resilience for
important social choice scenarios; in fact, we view the
simplicity of the methods as a merit, as it, e.g., allows
to easily explain their operation to laymen voters.
Next we discuss pressing avenues for future research.
Further settings. Further research is needed to under-
stand the possibility of sybil resilience for social choice
settings other than those considered here, such as mul-
tidimensional parameter update and multiwinner elec-
tions. Furthermore, other types of elections (besides here
we considered 1-Approval and ordinal elections) deserve
study; e.g., cumulative voting (and also quadratic vot-
ing [Lalley and Weyl, 2018]) allows minorities to con-
centrate their voting power. To counter this, sybil-
resilient cumulative/quadratic voting might take an ap-
proach similar to the approach for sybil-resilient param-
eter update, by “suppressing σ-most lucrative voters”.
Further base rules. While exploring additional set-
tings we should also explore appropriate base rules for
such settings. In addition, we should explore additional
base rules for the settings at hand.
Mitigating partial participation. While sybils have
clear incentive to vote on issues they wish to control,
genuine agents, especially if operated by humans, might
be less motivated. Thus, there is a need to augment
the analysis described here to this more realistic setting.
One approach would be to use vote delegation, as is done,
e.g., in liquid democracy.
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